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Abstract: Carbon dioxide capture and geological storage is seen as a promising technology to mitigate 
greenhouse gas atmospheric emissions. Its wide-scale implementation necessitates demonstrating its 
safety for humans and the environment. We have developed a generic approach to provide references 
for safety assessment of CO2 storage. It is composed of a series of simple tools for identifying risk 
scenarios, modelling risk events and exposure. It incorporates a rigorous management of uncertainty, 
distinguishing between variability and knowledge incompleteness. We applied this approach on a case 
study in the Paris Basin. This demonstrates how it delivers conditions mixing qualitative and 
quantitative elements for guaranteeing safety. This approach is flexible; it can be used for various sites 
and with various amounts of data. It can be carried out in a time-efficient manner at various stages of a 
project. In particular, it provides an operator or an authority with safety indicators in an early phase or 
for reviewing a risk assessment. Though not a complete risk assessment workflow, it thus partly 
compensates for the current lack of commonly acknowledged assessment methods or safety standards 
for CO2 geological storage. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Reducing greenhouse gas anthropogenic emissions to mitigate climate change and ocean acidification 
requires a portfolio of measures, such as improving energy efficiency and increasing renewable energy 
production. Carbon dioxide capture and geological storage (CCS) is seen as a decisive technology in 
this portfolio: its capability to effectively reduce greenhouse gas emissions to the atmosphere in the 
long term has been validated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [1]; the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) recently evaluated the contribution of CCS to emissions reductions by 2050 to 
one fifth in order to achieve the most cost-effective stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations [2]. 
From this result, the IEA concludes that the implementation of the technology should reach 100 
projects in 2020, and more than 3000 in 2050 representing an amount of 10 GTCO2 stored per year [2]. 
These figures highlight the number of storage sites that should be operated. Care will be required on 
all these sites to ensure that the storage is both efficient and safe: safety of CO2 storage is a key issue 
for wide scale implementation of the CCS technology [3]. Risk assessment for CO2 storage has been a 
research topic so far, as testified by the activity of the IEA GHG Risk Assessment Network ([4], [5]). 
Neither safety standards nor a commonly acknowledged methodology in this field have emerged. 
 
We propose a simple and flexible approach to determine safety criteria for a CO2 geological storage 
project, incorporating quantitative and qualitative information related to the site. This approach does 
not deliver a complete risk assessment; it is thought to supply relevant elements to evaluate safety in a 
time-efficient manner. It can be run with a limited amount of data and enriched when more knowledge 
becomes available. Therefore it is useful: 
- either at an early stage of a project, for targeting site characterisation at the potentially critical 
elements, 
- or at the licensing stage, providing the competent authority with assessment criteria for reviewing a 
risk analysis. 
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Our approach seeks to encompass all the potential risk scenarios, from geomechanical risks to CO2 
leakage risks. It is based on simplified modelling to evaluate the potential consequences of these 
scenarios. It incorporates an uncertainty management framework, whose purpose is to faithfully 
represent and propagate the uncertainty related to the site properties. The development of this 
approach has been supported by a case study in the Paris Basin. 
 
2. PURPOSE AND CONCEPT 
 
Safety assessment presents a number of challenges for CO2 geological storage. As an emerging 
technology, it can only rely on a limited experience. Few pilot storage projects have been operating so 
far, the oldest counting about 15 years experience. Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) has been running 
for more than 30 years, with a slightly different scope than CO2 storage though, since usually EOR 
was not designed in the purpose of retaining CO2 in the underground. Natural gas seasonal storage 
experience also has limited value for CO2 storage risk assessment, due to significant differences in the 
fluid properties, in the physico-chemical processes involved and in the time scales for containment. 
Furthermore, experience gained through all these techniques is relevant for time scales in the order of 
a few decades. CO2 storage on the contrary aims at containment for a few centuries or millennia. 
Safety assessment for CO2 storage therefore requires investigating unusual time scales. Comparisons 
with research carried out on nuclear waste deep disposal risks do not seem relevant either, due to the 
processes involved and the corresponding time scales. 
 
In addition to time scales and limited experience, CO2 storage safety assessment must face variability 
between sites, and intrinsic uncertainty surrounding the geological medium. Unlike engineered 
systems, the storage complex investigated for injecting CO2 cannot be completely depicted. It is a 
continuous medium known through punctual and/or indirect measurements. Therefore, though the 
purpose of site characterisation is to reduce uncertainty as much as possible, risk assessment has to 
deal with somewhat significant residual uncertainty. Besides, the underground varying from one site to 
another, lessons learned through one project can be transposed only with care to another. 
 
For all these reasons, combined with the complexity of representing the various phenomena that 
intervene in the CO2 storage behaviour, it appears impossible to define generic quantitative safety 
standards. No quantitative risk assessment methodology has been established so far. In particular, for 
CO2 geological storage the concept of probabilistic safety assessment must be cautiously considered. 
Experience feedback can inform failure probabilities for the engineered components; in our case wells 
only. Failure probabilities for natural components of the storage complex would be poorly reliable, 
because of site specificity. At best qualitative probability could be elicited. 
 
Instead of probabilistic safety assessment, we propose an alternative approach combining quantitative 
and qualitative elements, and consisting in identifying the potentially critical risk scenarios and 
evaluating their assumed consequences. We want to deduce requirements to prevent the occurrence of 
these events or guarantee that their magnitude is contained within an acceptable range, as defined by 
the potential impacts on human health and environmental safety. Such requirements would relate to 
the properties of the reservoir or other components of the complex (cap rock, wells…), i.e. to 
characterisation needs, or to injection parameters (pressure, flow rate…), i.e. to operational design. 
Requirements for monitoring and risk mitigation measures can be inferred then. 
 
We are looking at a framework that would be: 
- flexible, to be applied and suited to each site; 
- simple, in the sense that it should be possible to use it in a time-efficient manner with various levels 
of knowledge. Thus, an operator in an early phase of its project could employ it to identify critical 
points and target site investigation accordingly. In a licensing process, the competent authority 
could in turn use it to screen in the application whether and how major issues were addressed. 
We therefore rely on simple modelling, promoting analytical or semi-analytical models to the extent 
possible. In addition to computing time efficiency, simple models allow assessing uncertainty 
propagation. This is a critical point for risk assessment to represent the level of uncertainty and be able 
to identify its sources. Having made the choice of simple modelling, avoiding over-simplifying raises 
a concern. Meanwhile, in a precautionary approach, conservative assumptions should be preferred in 
the model. The correct but tricky attitude consists in adopting reasonably conservative assumptions. 
 
The approach should deliver requirements to guarantee that the storage of CO2 at the considered site is 
safe to human and the environment. These requirements would be quantitative when sufficient data is 
available. Where too much unknown remains, they will take the form of qualitative statements. 
 
3. RISK SCENARIOS AND MODELS USED 
 
Implementing our approach, where safety requirements are determined according to the impacts that 
can result from unexpected behaviours, requires performing the following steps, which are not unusual 
in risk assessment: 
- evaluate the expected behaviour (or the range of “normal” behaviours) of CO2 and the storage 
complex; 
- identify credible risk scenarios, i.e. possible evolutions deviating from this range; 
- estimate the potential magnitude of dangerous phenomena resulting from these alternative 
scenarios; 
- assess the corresponding impacts against acceptance criteria (usually defined by regulation). 
The following paragraphs present the main tools we propose for carrying this out. 
 
3.1. Reservoir flow and pressure 
 
We compute the extent of the CO2 plume in the reservoir with the analytical model developed by 
Nordbotten et al. ([6], [7], [8]; see [9]), and the pressure field in the reservoir using the analytical 
model developed in [10]. These models suppose a plane horizontal reservoir of constant thickness and 
radial symmetry (no natural brine flow in the aquifer), as well as sharp brine – CO2 interface (capillary 
pressure effects are ignored). The flow model delivers the thickness of the CO2 front as a function of 
time and distance to the injection well. We extract from there the maximum extent reached by CO2 or 
the thickness of the CO2 front at a given point. Note that the flow model is only valid when buoyancy 
is not dominant; otherwise it resorts to semi-analytical resolution of a differential equation. Moreover, 
these models can only be used over the injection period; beyond, numerical models must be applied. 
 
3.2. Risk scenarios identification 
 
In the frame of our research, we employ a risk scenario identification method based on expert 
workshops, derived from the approach described in [11]. A generic list of 11 risk events has been 
established ([12]), not restricted to leakage risks, but considering also geomechanical risks for 
instance. Experts must determine from this list the relevant events in the light of their knowledge of 
the site and the results of simulations for the expected behaviour. 
 
3.3. Well leakage 
 
CO2 leakage through a well is studied through a sequence of two analytical models, as described in 
[13]. At first, CO2 entry into the well is represented by a one-dimension Darcy flow model through the 
seals (well casing and cement plugs). Then, under a conservative assumption, we evaluate CO2 rise in 
the well seen as a column filled with water. This model thus delivers pessimistic estimates of the CO2 
flow rate and rising time out of the well, as a function of overpressure, CO2 front thickness in the 
reservoir, and characteristics of the well, especially thickness and permeability of its seals. 
 
3.4. CO2 rise in a porous column 
 
An analytical model of one-dimension Darcy flow through a vertical porous column is employed to 
assess the case of cap rock sealing deficiency: leakage through a fault or a permeable zone in the cap 
rock. It delivers the CO2 flow rate and rising time as a function of overpressure in the reservoir and 
transport properties of the leakage pathway. A homogeneous column with an equivalent overall 
permeability can substitute for a column composed of layers with varying permeability. 
 
3.5. Cap rock integrity 
 
Cap rock mechanical integrity failure in the injector’s vicinity is evaluated through the semi-analytical 
model set up in [14]: a linear regression from a limited number of numerical computations establishes 
the effective stress as a function of pressure at the basis of the cap rock and a number of site 
geometrical, mechanical and petrophysical properties. It enables the assessment of the mechanical 
failure criterion as a function of these parameters, for both the tensile and shear slip failure modes. 
 
3.6. Exposure models and leakage thresholds 
 
Loss of cap rock integrity is a priori considered unacceptable. Regarding CO2 leakage, criteria relate to 
their potential impacts. Two main kinds of vulnerable assets are considered here, corresponding to the 
hypothesis of onshore storage: human health and the environment at ground level; freshwater aquifers. 
Others would include other underground resources or offshore ecosystems. 
 
3.6.1. Surface exposure 
 
Potential effects of CO2 leakage to the surface on health and the environment depend on the exposure 
of the vulnerable assets. Regulatory thresholds exist in many countries to regulate human exposure to 
CO2 ([1]). In France, these thresholds on CO2 atmospheric content are as follows ([15], [16]): 
- 0.5% for occupational exposure (time-weighted 8 hour average); 
- 5% short-term exposure limit: irreversible effects; 
- 10% short-term exposure limit: first lethal effects; 
- 20% short-term exposure limit: significant lethal effects. 
Impacts of elevated CO2 exposure of ecosystems are much less understood, the response of individual 
species being highly variable ([17]). It is believed that many air breathing animals have fairly 
comparable tolerance to CO2 with humans ([18]). 
 
In a precautionary approach, we suggest to adopt the most stringent threshold for human health (0.5%) 
as acceptable limit at ground level. Alternatively, we could differentiate between acute (5% limit) and 
prolonged exposure (0.5% time-weighted limit). 
 
These thresholds are expressed in terms of CO2 atmospheric content, while the CO2 leakage models 
provide values for flow rates. Therefore a conversion from flow rate to concentration is required. We 
propose a perhaps excessively conservative computation derived from [19]. The leakage pathway is 
assumed to open right into a building. The leaking gas flows directly into the building, without any 
attenuation in the geological layers, neither in the vadose zone nor in the foundations of the edifice. 
Typical geometrical parameters for a house and ventilation rates are taken from literature relative to 
exposure to radon ([20]) and to construction work ([21]): for a 250 m3 building with a ventilation rate 
of 0.5 h-1, a simple dilution computation shows that, to remain below 0.5% CO2 in the indoor 
atmosphere, it is required to maintain the CO2 flow rate below 0.3 g.s-1. 
 
3.6.2. CO2 entry into a freshwater aquifer 
 
Changes in freshwater chemistry due to CO2 intrusion following a migration from the storage reservoir 
can be studied through reactive transport simulations of an underground source of drinking water. 
Chemical effects are highly dependent from the site conditions in terms of initial water composition, 
aquifer mineralogy and hydraulic properties. Reactive transport modelling teaches potential changes in 
pH and concentration of a number of ions (e.g. nitrates or nitrites) or elements (e.g. lead or iron); the 
resulting concentrations can then be compared to regulatory quality limits for water consumption, as 
established in the European Union according to the Directive [22]. However, such modelling to 
evaluate water quality changes where it is produced is highly site-specific. We have not solved how to 
incorporate the study of these impacts in our generic framework. Consequently in the following we 
focus on surface exposure. Site-specific simulations may nevertheless induce more stringent criteria 
on leakage rates to guarantee that accidents do not excessively alter water quality. 
 
4. UNCERTAINTY MANAGEMENT 
 
Assessing risk involves taking uncertainties into account, which represents a particular challenge for 
CO2 geological storage due to significant uncertainty pervading site knowledge. The proper 
uncertainty assessment of parameters needs to distinguish between two kinds of uncertainty (e.g. 
[23]): 
- stochastic uncertainty, i.e. variability, related to natural heterogeneity; 
- epistemic uncertainty, resulting from imprecision or incompleteness of available information. 
Stochastic uncertainty can be depicted as an objective uncertainty, since it reflects natural variations. 
Epistemic uncertainty is subjective in the sense that it refers to the position of the scientist with respect 
to his study’s object, and can be reduced by further measurements. It seems therefore crucial in a risk 
assessment process to faithfully represent the genuine knowledge about the system, separating these 
two types of uncertainty. Mixing them up boils down indeed to pretending to have more information 
than available, and introduces a bias in the assessment. 
 
In classical probability theory, uncertainty is accounted for by using probability density functions. 
While this is appropriate to render variability, it does not correctly reflect epistemic uncertainty: 
assuming a shape for the probability density function already introduces an arbitrary choice. Other 
uncertainty theories have been developed to face information imprecision or incompleteness, such as 
possibility theory ([24]). A hybrid method, called Independent Random Set ([25]), is used here to 
propagate jointly aleatory and epistemic uncertainty. In this approach, the choice of the mathematical 
tool representing a parameter must fit the amount of knowledge: when enough data is available to 
characterise natural variability, a probability density function is assigned; otherwise a possibility 
distribution is used. In practice, from possibility distributions we can derive pairs of lower and upper 
probability bounds, the “actual” probability function lying somewhere in between these two extreme 
probability curves. The distance between the two bounds reflects knowledge imprecision. 
 
We illustrate this approach on the example of our reservoir flow model, in the context of the Paris 
Basin, considering the Dogger aquifer for CO2 injection. A salinity map for this aquifer is available; 
therefore the salinity in a given area can be represented as a probabilistic variable (Figure 1, left). For 
porosity on the contrary, only few measures are available, and we know that the measurement process 
provides relatively imprecise values. This is why a possibility distribution, modelling a nested set of 
confidence intervals, is preferred. Measures have shown that most values are comprised between 10 
and 20%, and that values below 3% or above 26% are considered impossible; the distribution reports 
these lessons (Figure 1, right). 
 
Figure 1: Example of probability distribution for salinity in the Dogger aquifer – random 
sampling on the salinity map in an area investigated for CO2 storage (left, from [9]); possibility 
distribution for porosity in the Dogger aquifer (right) 
Time efficiency of analytical or semi-analytical models computations allows running a large number 
of simulations and thus propagating uncertainty. One of the major benefits of this approach is its 
ability to identify most sensitive parameters. It indicates the parameters for which additional 
characterisation would be the most effective for decreasing output uncertainty. 
 
The Independent Random Set method delivers a pair of lower and upper cumulative distribution 
functions as outcome of uncertainty propagation. This means that we have a lower and an upper 
bounds for the probability distribution of the considered variable. Figure 2 shows an example of 
outcome of the CO2 flow model applied to the case of the Dogger aquifer in the Paris Basin. 
Obviously assessing risk requires making a decision, which means introducing subjectivity at some 
point in the process. The hybrid method employed here does not suppress subjectivity. It intends to 
make it intervene downstream the computation process: the decision maker is provided with a 
mathematical representation that faithfully reflects the level of knowledge, and, being fully aware of it, 
can build an informed decision. In the classical probabilistic approach, subjectivity is introduced from 
the beginning of the computation, hiding imprecision behind a distribution which seems to only 
represent variability ([23]). Therefore the decision is not made in full awareness of the knowledge of 
the system. 
 
A shortcoming of the hybrid approach though is that the decision maker is faced with two bounds for 
the probability distribution, none of them being the actual one. This output might be of uncomfortable 
use. One bound corresponds to the optimistic vision of the system and would be found non 
conservative in a risk assessment process. The other one does not account for favourable elements and 
would be found unduly conservative. A reasonably conservative use would promote the pessimistic 
bound, without totally excluding values that plead for a more optimistic view. According to [26], we 
hence propose in the uncertainty computation a weighted averaging of the bounds, with a higher 
coefficient for the pessimistic one. These weights must be set by the decision maker, depending on the 
context and his or her behaviour in the face of risk. We suggest values of 2/3 for the pessimistic 
bound, 1/3 for the optimistic bound as reasonably conservative weighing coefficient in a risk 
assessment. This weighing delivers a unique probability curve that we dub “confidence index”, as 
illustrated on Figure 2. This curve can be readily exploited for making decision, while being aware 
that imprecision is managed through these weighing coefficients. An alternative approach, more in 
line with the Bayesian philosophy, would be to select such a confidence index for all input parameters 
tainted with partial ignorance, and run a probabilistic simulation on top of the hybrid one. Either 
approach yields a subjective plausible prediction, along with higher order uncertainty bounds. 
 
Figure 2: example of possibility distribution for CO2 extent in the reservoir, as resulting from 
the application of the CO2 flow model in the Dogger aquifer in the Paris Basin, and confidence 
index using a weight of 2/3 for the pessimistic bound, 1/3 for the optimistic bound. 
 
5. PROPOSED WORKFLOW 
 
We recommend that the safety assessment be supported by a Geographical Information System (GIS), 
figuring the potential conduits between the reservoir and upper layer up to the surface, as well as the 
vulnerable assets, in particular land use and environmental constraints in surface. The workflow we 
suggest consists in the three following steps: 
1. The reservoir flow model is run to estimate the maximum extent of the CO2 plume, assuming 
injection through a single well. We refer to the confidence index for this estimate, while 
uncertainty propagation permits the analysis of other plausible behaviours if desired. The intent 
here being comprehensiveness, the 100% confidence index value is employed. 
2. Based on this outcome, a risk scenarios identification workshop is held, where the selection of 
relevant scenarios is justified and documented. In particular, the existing features located in the 
CO2 extent area and constituting prospective connections between the reservoir and upper layers 
can be easily identified with basic GIS tools. Then a probability of being reached may be assigned 
to each of these conduits from the confidence index curve computed for the reservoir flow model. 
3. According to the selected scenarios, the corresponding models are used in a deterministic way. 
With regards to cap rock mechanical integrity, the abacus drawn in [14] delivers the tolerable 
pressure in the injector’s vicinity as a function of site properties to prevent fracturing. For each 
potential leakage pathway, we determine from the reservoir models the pressure and CO2 front 
thickness at the basis. Assuming it will leak, the maximum leakage flow rate is computed for a 
range of credible properties of the conduit (e.g. well plugs and annular thickness and permeability; 
fault width, length and permeability). Conversely, it leads to determining the sets of properties that 
satisfy a maximum flow smaller than the threshold for impacts. 
The comparison of the risk models outcomes to the acceptance criteria described above thus 
determines constraints on natural or operational parameters to guarantee that the critical thresholds are 
not exceeded. When data are too scarce and the models cannot deliver quantitative requirements, 
qualitative expectations can be expressed. Overall this process translates into characterisation needs or 
design constraints for the project. Besides, the performance must be sustained over the long term; 
additional studies may be necessary to verify it, for instance to take chemical effects into account. 
 
The approach being conservative however, it would be inconsistent to consider these results as a 
necessity. They constitute sufficient conditions, i.e. respecting these constraints ensures that no impact 
would occur; but it does not exclude that a site is safe with less stringent parameters. Moreover, we 
underline that our approach stands in the frame of an assessment of risks. Here we assume the 
occurrence of an abnormal behaviour, e.g. through neglecting capillary entry pressure in our CO2 rise 
models; we examine the characteristics ensuring that it nevertheless does not generate adverse 
consequences on human health or the environment. This process does not represent the expected 
behaviour, which, in conformity with [27], should achieve long term containment of CO2 in the 
storage formation. 
 
6. CASE STUDY 
 
6.1. Site presentation and injection scenario 
 
For the sake of clarity, we exemplify the application of our global workflow on a hypothetical case 
study in the context of the Paris Basin. This works builds on the results of the PICOREF project ([28]). 
The region investigated is located in the Southeast of the Paris Basin, about 100 km east of Paris. The 
storage target is the Dogger limestone aquifer, which depth in this area is about 1500 m. Two zones 
have been identified in [28] as potential storage sites, the eastern being preferred due to greater 
thickness of the aquifer. We arbitrarily chose an injection point in this eastern zone outside the 
environmental protection areas, such that it is roughly equidistant from the three nearest wells (Figure 
3). We consider here 20 years CO2 injection at 5 Mt/yr. 
 
Figure 3: Location of the case study, injection point, wells and faults reaching the Dogger top, 
and some environmental constraints in surface (some of these constraints are not shown here) 
 
 
6.2. Results 
 
Reservoir flow simulations revealed a maximum extent of 14.8 km. In this radius around the injection 
well, 13 wells reaching the Dogger top are listed. The three closest wells are located 6.2 km away 
from the injector. One fault reaching the Dogger top is mapped in this area, 8.4 km south of the 
injection well. The confidence index for CO2 to attain these features is reported in table 1, which also 
indicates the lower and upper probability bounds. 
 
Table 1: Probability for CO2 to reach the potential leakage pathways in our case study (20 years 
CO2 injection at 5 Mt/yr) 
Feature Distance to the injection well (km) 
Probability of being attained by CO2 
(Confidence index estimate) (%) 
Lower 
probability (%) 
Upper 
probability (%) 
Well 6,2 100 0 100 
Well 6,2 100 0 100 
Well 6,2 100 0 100 
Well 6,7 100 0 100 
Well 6,8 100 0 100 
Well 7,0 100 0 100 
Well 7,7 99 0 100 
Well 8,1 94 0 100 
Fault 8,4 84 0 100 
Well 8,6 80 0 100 
Well 10,8 4 0 73 
Well 11,2 0 0 63 
Well 12,6 0 0 33 
Well 13,3 0 0 12 
The well leakage model computes that no adverse impact at ground level is to be feared from the wells 
located at 6.2 km from the injection as soon as each of them is sealed with: 
- a cement plug of thickness and effective permeability such that their ratio is durably greater than 
2.1016 m-1 (or a series of plugs such that the sum of these ratios for all of them is greater than this 
value); 
- or a cemented casing covering the whole thickness of the storage aquifer such that the ratio 
between its thickness and its permeability is durably greater than 3.1018 m-1. 
That is to say, a 2 m thick plug with permeability 0.1 mD is enough to verify this criterion; so would 
be a 3 cm thick casing with permeability 0.01 µD. A similar computation can be performed for each of 
the other 10 wells recorded in the area. The probability determined in table 1 can be used to weigh the 
criticality of a leak. We note that the confidence index for reaching the three furthest wells is zero; 
then these wells should only be considered if the decision maker wants to be particularly cautious and 
refers to the pessimistic approach. However, this probability does not represent a leakage probability, 
as it does not incorporate a failure probability (or rather it assumes a 100% failure probability, which 
would usually not correspond to reality). 
 
The porous column model shows that no adverse impact would occur from leakage through the 
identified fault if its permeability and its section at surface with a 100 m² plan (corresponding to the 
surface area of the reference building in our exposure model) are such that their product is smaller 
than 6.5.10-15 m4. For instance, considering 10 m length for this building, a 10 cm wide fault zone 
would not generate a hazardous exposure if its effective permeability is smaller than 6.5 mD. 
 
The cap rock mechanical integrity model shows that no tensile fracturing occurs in the injection zone 
for an injection pressure smaller than 1.7 times the initial pressure. The abacus in [14] demonstrates 
that shear slip reactivation depends on a number of parameters, among which the initial stress state 
ratio and the critical internal friction angle are particularly sensitive. Therefore these parameters shall 
be characterised. When they are respectively greater than 0.7 and equal to 30°, an injection pressure of 
1.7 times the initial pressure does not lead to shear slip reactivation either. Under these conditions, this 
value of overpressure, i.e. 28 MPa, is therefore sustainable. 
 
The expert workshop identified globally 9 events to investigate; requirements relating to the other risk 
scenarios are mainly qualitative at this stage. Further studies would be necessary to translate these 
conditions into quantitative criteria. The scenarios and corresponding conditions along with additional 
works needed are reported in table 2. 
 
Table 2: Relevant risk scenarios for the case study and corresponding requirements 
Scenario Condition 
Leakage via an operational well The well(s) must be designed and constructed according to the best available techniques and have the necessary integrity properties. 
Local over-pressurisation around the 
injection well 
Flow rate and pressure limits determined according to injectivity 
constraints. 
Reservoir overpressurisation (regional 
scale) 
Quantitative criterion on overpressure depending on site 
characteristics (see text above). 
Expected lateral extent exceeded 
Consider the pessimistic bound in the CO2 extent calculation. 
Consider lowering the injection rate to avoid reaching the leakage 
pathways (listed in table 1). 
Leakage due to sealing deficiency of the 
cap rock 
Cap rock should present sufficient continuity and sealing properties, 
which must be sustained over time. 
Leakage via existing faults Quantitative criterion on permeability and section for the identified fault (see text above). 
Leakage via an abandoned well Quantitative criterion on plugs and casing thickness and permeability for each identified well (see text above). 
Accumulation in a secondary reservoir 
following unexpected vertical migration 
The consequences on overlaying aquifers in case of leakage should 
be further investigated. 
Flow changes in overlaying aquifers Further studies should be carried out to identify a limit on overpressure in the reservoir with respect to this issue. 
7. DISCUSSION 
 
The framework we have achieved meets our expectations in terms of simplicity and flexibility. The 
whole process can be performed in a time-efficient manner; in particular, each of the models requires a 
computing time of only few seconds per simulation. The simplified models we have adopted constitute 
an alternative to the catalogue of simulations proposed in the Certification Framework ([29]), which 
pursues roughly similar objectives to ours. We underline that our approach is not designed to be used 
without a minimum knowledge of CO2 storage and geology matters: if the various tools are easy to 
manipulate, interpreting their results requires a somewhat critical look and a certain caution. 
 
Our approach appears flexible to various degrees of knowledge of the storage complex. The case study 
presented has been run with data from the literature. Though this area was investigated specifically in 
the PICOREF project ([28]), no field exploration has been carried out; the dataset can therefore be 
considered limited. Our application is then representative of an early stage of a storage project. 
Uncertainties would be reduced and results made more precise when running the proposed approach 
with an elaborate dataset. Computational efficiency makes it easily possible to run the process several 
times during a project to progressively incorporate new data acquired throughout the various stages. 
 
This approach is also flexible in terms of models used. We developed a consistent set of simplified 
models that meet the needs for simplicity. However, a user could basically replace every component 
he desires among them with more sophisticated models, the articulation between them remaining 
barely changed. For instance, a numerical reservoir model could substitute for our analytical model of 
CO2 extent and pressure field in the aquifer, the important point being the ability to deliver whether or 
not a leakage pathway can be reached by CO2 and what is the pressure at its basis. Swapping models, 
however, could affect the capacity to propagate uncertainties. We note nevertheless that in our 
approach the probability of reaching a conduit is only used as an indicator, and not directly for 
producing a risk evaluation. Therefore in the case where alternative models are employed with 
computing time preventing uncertainty propagation through multiple simulations, the user could still 
globally follow our approach, adopting a different strategy to investigate the effects of uncertainties 
such as less comprehensive sensitivity studies. 
 
The uncertainty management framework constitutes nonetheless to our view a major strength of the 
approach described here. Through a rigorous representation and propagation of uncertainty, it leads to 
an unbiased view of the sources of uncertainty and how further characterisation can decrease it. It 
serves the purpose of targeting site investigation. Updating the available data in the course of the 
project as mentioned above, the hybrid method tools would deliver a clear survey of uncertainty 
reduction in the safety assessment as knowledge of the site increases. 
 
The approached described in this paper incorporates a scenario identification stage, which 
encompasses all kinds of risks from leaks to geomechanical disruptions. In that respect, it goes beyond 
the work presented in [29], directly focused on well and fault leakage. However, some risks cannot be 
quantitatively investigated with the models built so far. A model would be needed for instance for 
evaluating the hydrodynamic impact in overlaying aquifers as a result of pressure buildup in the 
storage formation. Brine leakage scenarios have not been modelled either. Besides, further 
developments could be brought to the CO2 rise models in order to make them less conservative; 
attenuation through the geological layers for instance has not been taken into account yet. 
 
Exposure models need to be refined as well. The surface exposure model is particularly pessimistic. 
CO2 dispersion calculation could be suggested (e.g. [30]) to define a more realistic acceptable leakage 
rate; the difficulty would then relate to the level of generality, since Chow et al. [31] demonstrate the 
need to take account of site-specific conditions. A similar concern goes for aquifer impacts: site-
specific reactive transport modelling of CO2 intrusion into a freshwater aquifer is envisaged, but it 
seems doubtful how a generic model or a reference leakage rate could be established. 
 
Eventually a benchmark study of the reservoir analytical model versus simple numerical models is 
underway. It seeks to determine whether it is feasible to extrapolate the results of the analytical model 
beyond the injection period, in order to improve the treatment of long term risks in our workflow. 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
We have described a simple approach for assessing safety of a CO2 geological storage site. It is 
flexible and can take into account the specific properties of each site. It involves a set of components 
designed to be used in a simple and time-efficient manner. It includes an uncertainty management 
framework that distinguishes between variability and knowledge incompleteness, therefore indicating 
where uncertainty can be effectively reduced by additional knowledge acquisition. We applied this 
approach to a case study in the Paris Basin. The application illustrates how qualitative and quantitative 
inputs are exploited so as to provide conditions that ensure that CO2 storage is safe on the short and the 
long term. 
 
Though not a complete risk assessment framework, the demonstrated developments compose a global 
approach that allows for screening and assessing the critical elements for storage safety at a given site. 
As currently no risk assessment workflow or safety standards for CO2 storage have been established 
and commonly accepted, the approach presented partly fills this gap by giving means to determine 
safety references. It therefore constitutes one more step toward wide-scale implementation of CO2 
capture and storage under safe conditions, which addresses the urge to act to mitigate greenhouse gas 
emissions while ensuring the absence of significant impacts for populations and the local environment.  
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